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Abstract
This article reviews the biological and occupational medicine literature related to H5N1 pandemic
influenza and its impact on infection control, cost and business continuity in settings outside the
health care community. The literature on H5N1 biology is reviewed including the treatment and
infection control mechanisms as they pertain to occupational medicine. Planning activity for the
potential arrival of pandemic avian influenza is growing rapidly. Much has been published on the
molecular biology of H5N1 but there remains a paucity of literature on the occupational medicine
impacts to organizations. This review summarizes some of the basic science surrounding H5N1
influenza and raises some key concerns in pandemic planning for the occupational medicine
professional. Workplaces other than health care settings will be impacted greatly by an H5N1
pandemic and the occupational physician will play an essential role in corporate preparation,
response, and business continuity strategies.
Introduction
The occupational medicine community has been adress-
ing occupational diseases of epidemic proportions since
Ramazzini first studied injured workers. Traditionally,
these diseases have been musculoskeletal, psychiatric or
toxicologic in nature. When the etiology of these condi-
tions has been identified, appropriate measures have been
taken to mitigate the risk of becoming ill or injured. Occu-
pational health specialists are therefore quite adept at
looking at prevention when the causative factors are
known and their mechanism of action understood. How-
ever, when the process is poorly understood, as is the case
with pandemic influenza, determining the most appropri-
ate prevention and mitigation strategy is more complex.
Despite this uncertainty, government agencies and busi-
nesses are taking measures to address the impact of a
potential pandemic influenza on their workforce [1,2].
The field of occupational medicine is being consulted to
assist in mitigating the impact of an avian influenza pan-
demic on their human resources, business continuity and
also the societal impact associated with essential services
and disease transmission. This article will outline the
nature of pandemic avian influenza and some of the
unique considerations related to the occupational envi-
ronment outside the health care setting.
Learning from SARS
Occupational medicine professionals are uniquely posi-
tioned to provide information on the potential impact of
a pandemic influenza. Indeed, infectious disease may dis-
proportionately impact the occupational environment.
This is due to factors associated with transmission such as
the proximity of co-workers to one another in the work-
place, during the daily commute to work, or simply deal-
ing face to face with customers. Of particular concern is
the health and safety of those health care professionals
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caring for infected patients. The recent experience with
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) provides some
useful insight into the consequences of a novel infection
on a modern society and more specifically on the health
care community.
There are many similarities between the SARS epidemic
and the anticipated experience with avian influenza. Both
have been associated with food and animals. In the early
stages of SARS, more than a third of infected humans were
food handlers [3], and it was later inferred that the SARS
coronavirus had originated in civet cats, and that the first
transmission of infection to humans may have occurred
in those workers handling civet cats [4]. However, the
greatest impact of SARS was subsequently felt in health
care workers where they were estimated to have accounted
for over 20% of total SARS cases in Singapore and 40% in
Canada [5]. Thus, not only are individuals working
closely with infected animal hosts at risk for first line
crossover transmission of an emerging virus but they are
also at risk of acquiring the virus from coworkers, or in the
case of health care professionals, from patients.
Influenza Virology
Influenza are single stranded RNA viruses and are part of
the Orthomyxoviradae family [6]. Influenza A and B can
recur in individuals because of their ongoing mutation.
Antigenic drifts can occur in seasonal influenza and if suf-
ficient mutations arise in the surface proteins Hemaglut-
tinin or Neuraminidase, it can result in a novel strain.
Thus 'H' and 'N' components determine the different
potential subtypes of a given influenza virus, and at
present a total of 15 H variants exist while 9 N subtypes
have been identified. The ongoing emergence of small but
significant mutations can lead to epidemics which we
experience as seasonal influenza. The yearly influenza vac-
cination program is based on correctly determining which
of these subtle changes (drift) will become predominant.
Pandemic influenza, such as the suspected H5N1avian
influenza, occurs as a result of major changes in surface
proteins of influenza viruses known as an antigenic shift.
This novel strain which is present in animals still requires
further modification before it can effectively spread
among the human population. This situation can be cre-
ated via transmission from a different species with fre-
quent exposure leading to adaptation, or from genetic
reassortment [6]. The process of reassortment happens
when an individual simultaneously has both human and
avian influenza subtypes. This allows for a recombination
of viral components, leading to a new viral form with the
potential for efficient transmission between humans. This
form of the virus would still contain avian viral surface
proteins. When this occurs humans have minimal or no
immunity against the virus, enabling a large geographic
spread of disease with high attack rates [6,7]. It should be
noted that H5N1 is not the only avian influenza that has
the capacity to affect humans. H7N2 is slowly progressing
globally, and while less pathogenic than H5N1, has
caused illness in poultry workers. To date, neither of these
avian influenzas has gained the capacity to spread effi-
ciently from human to human.
Pandemic influenza
Pandemic influenza occurs when a new strain of human
influenza arises that humans have minimal or absent pre-
existing natural immunity, which causes disease, can be
easily transmitted from person to person, and is globally
widespread (on 3 continents at one time) [7] or exhibits
community level outbreaks in two WHO regions. In
today's globalized economy and interdependent supply
chain, the work force is particularly sensitive to pandemic
infections and it is also a key mechanism for the geo-
graphic spread of a pandemic. On average, we experience
a pandemic about every thirty years. Indeed, in the 20th
century, there were three pandemic influenza outbreaks
which included: the Spanish Influenza (1918–1920),
Asian Influenza (1957–1958) and the Hong Kong Influ-
enza (1968–1969) [8]. This is not to suggest that simply
because 30 years have passed since the last pandemic, we
are overdue; it is simply meant to point out that pandem-
ics are relatively common events given the right condi-
tions. The current strain of influenza considered to have
pandemic potential is the highly pathogenic H5N1 strain
of avian influenza which has spread from Asia to Europe.
Moreover, its transmission to humans has intensified con-
cerns that a novel strain will emerge leading to human
infections of pandemic proportions [7]. The three criteria
that are required to enable a pandemic include: 1) the
presence of a new viral strain that is capable of infecting
humans, 2) ability to be transmitted from person to per-
son, and 3) availability of a susceptible global population
[6]. Thus, should a new viral strain emerge, the global
workforce provides and ideal vehicle in which transmis-
sion from person to person can occur within a susceptible
global population. The ability of H5N1 to propagate
between humans after an initial infection has not been
established and its probability is unknown. Thus avian
influenza has currently not developed into a pandemic
[6,9]. However, it is generally accepted that this will occur;
it is a matter of "when, not if". When this occurs, the
health care system will be particularly susceptible to pan-
demic influenza events. This is because patients with
influenza will place an enormous burden on already fully
taxed health care services and because health care profes-
sionals will come into direct contact with infected patients
rendering them susceptible to acquiring the virus. How-
ever, there are no industries that would be left unaffected
by an avian influenza pandemic, and therefore public
health agencies, government, and industry will need to
consider the level of interdependence they share.Journal of Occupational Medicine and Toxicology 2009, 4:15 http://www.occup-med.com/content/4/1/15
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Transmission
It is generally accepted that transmission of the influenza
virus occurs by host inhalation of viral droplets usually
greater than 5 μm in size [7,10]. A recent review of the
mechanism of influenza transmission concluded that the
virus is primarily transmitted at close quarters [11]. It can
also be transmitted by coming into contact with viral
laden fomites. Both of these methods are of great concern
in the workplace, due to use of communal equipment and
also in areas where employees work in close proximity.
Therefore, infection control measures will need to vary
between industries. For example, staff that work in isola-
tion or even outdoors could be at far less risk of transmis-
sion than having many employees in a single room such
as a telecommunications call center where individuals are
separated by small distances. Moreover, unlike seasonal
influenza which has an incubation period of one to four
days (average two), avian influenza has an incubation
period ranging from two to eight days [12]. This has
implications for staffing schedules and return to work pol-
icy when developing guidelines for pandemic influenza in
the workplace. Once again the nature of the control meas-
ures and advisement to employees may vary considerably
depending on the physical layout of the worksite.
The workplace as a transmission center
It is well established that occupational disease is already
an enormous contributor to the economic and human
resource strain on our health care systems. Many mecha-
nisms are in place to prevent or manage such disease
which may include ergonomic initiatives, exposure limits,
and corporate health and wellness programs. At the same
time, the workplace is one of the key pillars of societal
function, such that the health of a workplace is vital to the
health and functioning of our interdependent society.
This is particularly true when one considers such essential
services as health care, energy, communications, and food
supply sectors.
In the event of a pandemic influenza absenteeism will be
an enormous challenge. Employees will not be present
due to reasons such as: infection and illness from the pan-
demic influenza strain, exclusion from work while suffer-
ing an illness that is mistaken for or treated empirically as
influenza, caring for sick relatives, caring for children in
the event of day care and school closures by governments,
loss of public transportation and based on the fear of real
or perceived risk of infection at work or during travel [13].
The Public Health Agency of Canada is predicting total
work absenteeism of 35 to 50% during the whole disease
wave with the peak work absence ranging from 15 to 27%.
While it is tempting to look at absenteeism from within a
single organization, the functioning of a company is
almost always dependent on external clients, supply
chains, or multi-national locations. Thus, a large manu-
facturing plant in United States may require final product
detailing in another region of the country, which in turn
receives its raw materials from Asia or South America.
"Just on time" delivery processes have created a society in
which most companies (including health care institu-
tions) have less than a few weeks supply of essential goods
(including medications). Little is known about the global
timing and progression of H5N1 avian influenza at
present but it is entirely possible that while an organiza-
tion in North America is healthy, its supplier abroad is
experiencing a disease wave leading to uncoordinated
business efforts. Each company has an obligation to
ensure that occupational transmission is attenuated and
planned for, but this will also require cooperation with
governments that may impose social and travel restric-
tions to suppress the spread of the disease while still
maintaining business continuity and societal function.
Pandemic influenza, will have the capacity to disrupt serv-
ices and supply chains and thus requires significant plan-
ning and foresight from occupational medicine
professionals to help mitigate the health and economic
impacts to their organizations and to the functioning of
society [14].
Infection controls
As with any occupational disease, the interventions avail-
able to health professionals can be considered as engi-
neering or administrative controls. As well,
pharmaceutical controls (prophylaxis) for avian influenza
may provide an important role in prevention. However,
there is limited clinical evidence for the effectiveness of
currently available medications or vaccines.
Vaccines
Vaccination strategies, such as the annual influenza vac-
cine programs, have been the traditional first line of
defense against viral infections. Research is currently
being devoted to the development of vaccines as a possi-
ble intervention for pandemic influenza. The need for a
rapidly deliverable vaccine for pandemic influenza has
become more urgent since de Jong et al. [15] reported the
emergence of oseltamivir resistance to H5N1. Given the
current 4 to 6 month development time, it is unlikely that
a vaccination will be available during the first wave of a
pandemic. The impact of antigenic drift on vaccination for
influenza is an on ongoing challenge and is the reason
vaccination for seasonal influenza must be administered
annually to protect against the new antigenic strain.
Increased demand for vaccine during a pandemic influ-
enza may be tempered by the supply. Specifically, the sub-
strate used for vaccine manufacturing for all major
suppliers worldwide is chicken eggs [16]. During a pan-
demic several times the current supply of eggs would be
required. What is even more challenging is that H5N1,Journal of Occupational Medicine and Toxicology 2009, 4:15 http://www.occup-med.com/content/4/1/15
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which is the current predicted pandemic strain, is lethal in
eggs and is also a biosafety level 3 pathogen which
decreases the potential of scaling up the manufacture of
vaccine for international deployment [16]. One must also
consider that poultry workers may be at increased risk of
exposure to pandemic influenza zoonotically or may also
be stretched from a human resource perspective when
measures need to be taken to curb a poultry influenza out-
break [17]. Acambis Labs, and others, are working on the
development of a universal influenza vaccination that is
based on more stable surface proteins such as M2e, which
is found on the surface of all influenza A strains.
The first vaccine approved by the US food and Drug
Administration for pandemic influenza is a reverse genet-
ics vaccine and demonstrated low immunogenicity except
for high doses with an adjuvant [18]. When this was
approved by the FDA it was noted that the vaccine would
not be marketed to the general public but rather stock-
piled by governments[16]. It has previously been sug-
gested that an appropriate vaccine will likely not be
determined until the initial phase of a pandemic [19]. Fur-
thermore, once a vaccine is developed a mechanism needs
to be put in place that can provide an adequate supply at
an affordable cost globally in lock step with the progres-
sion of the pandemic.
A unique challenge for the occupational medicine physi-
cian in the event of a pandemic outbreak is to determine
who gets priority for receiving vaccination. Maintenance
of essential services will be central to the continuity of a
functioning society. Health care workers and workers in
critical occupations will be a priority for vaccination pro-
grams, once available. Decisions on vaccination programs
are complicated by the eventual timing of the disease
wave, number of employees, nature of the work environ-
ment, and the availability of vaccine. For example, should
employees who are in close proximity to one another be
given priority or only those critical to maintaining busi-
ness continuity? The Public Health Agency of Canada has
created priority lists for receipt of vaccinations [20]. Not
surprisingly health care workers are part of group 1, fol-
lowed by key societal decision makers and critical protec-
tion and utility workers (police, fire fighters, sewage
workers, public transportation and communications).
Supplying anti-virals
Another treatment option is the use of anti-viral medica-
tions. The two main classes of antivirals available at
present are the neuraminidase inhibitors and the adaman-
tanes. There has been an emergence of resistance to ada-
mantanes for seasonal influenza [21] leading many to
reconsider them as agents in the treatment of pandemic
avian influenza [22]. In preliminary studies using osel-
tamivir [23] or zanamivir [24], patients showed a reduc-
tion in the duration of symptoms ranging from 1–2 days.
Whether a 1–2 day reduction in symptoms will translate
into reduced absenteeism, cost-savings and disease trans-
mission is unknown. Additionally, the cost-benefit of
stockpiling anti-virals for treatment of pandemic influ-
enza remains unknown. As noted previously, oseltamivir
has also demonstrated resistance [15]. Adding to the com-
plexity of managing H5N1 treatment, is once again the
manner in which one decides who receives the medica-
tion and the fact that the modest reduction in influenza
symptoms will depend on timing of administration of the
drug. In individuals with confirmed H5N1 influenza that
were treated with oseltamivir, mortality was still close to
80% [25]. It has also been noted by Tambyah [22], that
despite guidelines from the World Health Organization
concerning the use of anti-virals in pandemic avian influ-
enza, there remains little 'level 1' clinical evidence to sup-
port such guidelines. More recently, a group in Singapore
has gathered a set of practical guidelines for clinicians
encountering H5N1 avian influenza in humans [26].
Despite the lack of scientific evidence for their effective-
ness in a pandemic situation, governments and many
employers are stockpiling anti-virals to be used not only
as therapy for ill individuals, but also as prophylaxis for
critical staff. This may be driven by the recognition that
once the pandemic is recognized, it will be nearly impos-
sible to purchase these products. It reflects a significant
investment: at approximately $3/pill, an eight week
course would cost over $200 per employee. A company of
1000 employees would need to invest $200,000 on a
product which they hope they will never use, is unproven,
and has a limited shelf life. Again, one is faced with deci-
sions regarding dispensing medication – to all workers,
critical workers, families?
Non-pharmaceutical controls
While the world waits for an effective pharmaceutical
intervention, non-pharmaceutical controls will need to be
considered to combat the spread of illness in the commu-
nity and the workplace.
Low [7] has outlined and adapted [27] five non-pharma-
ceutical public health interventions that would aid in the
mitigation of pandemic influenza. They include: hand
hygiene and respiratory etiquette, human surveillance,
rapid viral diagnosis, provider and patient use of masks
and other personal protective equipment and isolation of
the sick. All of these interventions will need to be coordi-
nated at organizational and government levels due to the
tremendous interrelationships affected by a pandemic.
Some of the above interventions have some unique impli-
cations from an occupational medicine perspective.
Hygiene and respiratory etiquette are particularly effective
in reducing the spread of infectious disease and representJournal of Occupational Medicine and Toxicology 2009, 4:15 http://www.occup-med.com/content/4/1/15
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a key defense against nosocomial infection in hospitals.
This also applies to a workplace where people are in close
proximity to one another where viral droplets may exist in
the air and on equipment or surfaces used by multiple
people each day. The spread of infection between employ-
ees is one possible transmission pathway, however the
occupational medicine professionals of large and com-
plex organizations must also consider the families of the
employees and the consumers of products where interac-
tion occurs with the public. Protection of the consumer
raises the issue of due diligence which can be complex for
service oriented organizations. Hand washing, social dis-
tancing and respiratory etiquette, if normalized and rigor-
ously adopted, may provide the most effective (certainly
most cost effective) means of protection.
N95 Respirators
The role of personal protective equipment in reducing the
spread of pandemic influenza is one of considerable
debate. Both the perceived and/or real efficacy of such
measures and the cost associated with the provision of
such materials are legitimate concerns for those coordi-
nating pandemic plans in the workplace. The gold stand-
ard for particulate inhalation in most cases is the use of
the N95 respirator. Droplet transmission is thought to be
the primary mode of transmission and is the basis of
guidelines for health professionals coming within 3 feet of
patients during seasonal influenza [7,28]. Therefore,
because N95 respirators can trap more than 95% of air-
borne particles [28,29], experience from their use in sea-
sonal influenza supports some effectiveness of their
application to pandemic avian influenza.
Regardless of the real or perceived protection that N95 res-
pirators provide to employees from transmitting or con-
tracting H5N1 influenza via inhalation, many challenges
exist with the use of such protective equipment. N95 res-
pirators require fit testing, need to be replaced, and tend
to be uncomfortable which create opportunities for their
improper and therefore ineffective use. Moreover, the
N95 respirators would impose a large cost to an organiza-
tion who decides they will outfit their employees with
them in the event of a pandemic. This cost is imposed by
buying a stockpile of the respirators, and the provision of
fit-testing for each and every employee issued a respirator.
Consider an organization that decides that during a two
week pandemic disease wave they will issue N95 masks to
1000 employees. Each respirator unit has a cost of $1, and
because the respirators need to be changed every 2–3
hours, each employee working an 8-hour day will require
3 masks per day. Therefore, each employee would require
30 masks over 2-weeks (10 working days), leading to a
cost of $30 per employee for a total of $30K for 1000
employees for two weeks. This does not include the cost
associated with fit-testing which takes approximately 20-
minutes per person, which would therefore require 333
hours of time to fit test 1000 employees. Furthermore, a
trained professional is required to perform the fit testing
procedure. Finally, does the employer provide N95 masks
for the families of the employees such that protection is
afforded to the family and the employee at home? All of
these measures will vary as the risk of transmission will
depend upon the nature of the worksite and the controls
put in place. For example, teleworking would greatly
reduce the number of employees that congregate at the
worksite. Not all industries will have this luxury.
Creating an environment in which employees are com-
fortable and confident of their safety in the workplace is
critical in enhancing their work attendance. Fear will be
rampant, and employee education well in advance of the
event will be vital in reducing the spread of disease,
myths, and ensuring corporate and social stability. Indeed
addressing both real and perceived risk of infection may
be the most crucial factor in maintaining business conti-
nuity in the face of a pandemic.
Conclusion
The scientific community is devoting a great deal of effort
and research funding towards what is considered by many
to be an inevitable pandemic. It has also been suggested
that even the most stringent non-pharmaceutical inter-
ventions are unlikely to prevent the pandemic or alter the
underlying biological susceptibility of a population to a
pandemic virus [7]. However, the prevention and man-
agement of disease transmission in the occupational envi-
ronment will play a central role in the health and
economic burden of pandemic influenza. With a long-
standing record of applying the latest science to appropri-
ate engineering and administrative disease controls, the
occupational medicine community can utilize these con-
cepts to prepare for and mitigate the potential impact on
industry and society.
Appendix
At the time this paper was submitted to this journal the
WHO and many governments are monitoring an out-
break of H1N1 swine influenza which has recently been
declared a pandemic. Cases have been confirmed here in
Nova Scotia, United States, UK, Spain and Israel with the
epicenter in Mexico where over 100 people have died.
While much of the literature focused on the future possi-
bility of H5N1 avian influenza pandemic, the H1N1
swine influenza strain was not of immediate concern to
the international community until the current outbreak in
Mexico.
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